Twenty years of punishment (and democracy) in South Africa: The pitfalls of governing crime through the community by Super, Gail
7SA Crime QuArterly No. 48 • juNe 2014
Twenty years of  
punishment (and 
democracy) in 
South Africa  





With the advent of formal democracy in South 
Africa in April 1994 one might have been justified 
in expecting that the criminal justice system would 
become less punitive and that this would entail 
less reliance on imprisonment as a punishment 
par excellence.1 However, although the numbers in 
custody have been reduced since an all-time high 
in 2004, South Africa has the highest incarceration 
rate in Africa and one of the highest in the world.2 In 
2013, the number of people serving life imprisonment 
stood at 11 000, as opposed to 400 in 1994.3 
Democratisation has thus brought with it a dramatic 
increase in long-term prison sentences, ranging 
from seven years to life. One of the consequences 
has been an escalation in the number of maximum 
security risk category prisoners. Prison overcrowding 
is rife (albeit unequally distributed) and social workers, 
psychologists and other professionals who are key 
for rehabilitation are in woefully short supply.4 Indeed, 
in overcrowded prisons, prisoners only have 1,2 m2 in 
which to eat, sleep and spend 23 hours of the day.5 
The conditions are, to say the least, appalling.6
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This article examines how the ideology of ‘community’ is deployed to govern crime in South Africa, both by 
marginalised black communities and by the government. Although the turn to ‘community’ started under the 
National Party government in the late 1970s, there is no doubt that as a site, technology, discourse, ideology 
and form of governance, ‘community’ has become entrenched in the post-1994 era. Utilising empirical data 
drawn from ethnographic research on vigilantism in Khayelitsha, as well as archival materials in respect of ANC 
policies and practices before it became the governing party, I argue that rallying ‘communities’ around crime 
combatting has the potential to unleash violent technologies in the quest for ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’. When 
community members unite against an outsider they are bonded for an intense moment in a way that masks the 
very real problems that tear the community apart. Because violent punishment is one of the consequences of 
the state’s turn towards democratic localism, we should question the way in which the ‘community’ is deployed 
as a tool of crime prevention, and subject it to rigorous scrutiny. 
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Yet, in 2002, precisely when the South African 
rate of imprisonment had almost peaked, the 
Department of Correctional Services introduced a 
restorative justice approach ‘aimed at facilitating the 
mediation and healing process between offenders, 
victims, family members and the community’.7 
This article discusses the apparent contradictions 
in, and consequences of, the state embracing 
‘community’ based criminal justice initiatives in 
tandem with long-term imprisonment. Although the 
turn to community started in the late 1970s, under 
the National Party government, there is no doubt 
that as a site, technology, discourse, ideology and 
form of governance, the ‘community’ has become 
entrenched in the post-1994 era. It is, of course, one 
of those terms that is so vague and amorphous as to 
be capable of many different meanings. As such, it 
appeals to all parts of the political spectrum. 
The paper focuses on the punitive underside of 
community, which, at its most extreme, manifests in 
the form of vigilante killings. Drawing on ethnographic 
and documentary research into non-state crime 
prevention and punishment practices in Khayelitsha, 
conducted between 2012 and 2014, I argue that 
vigilantism is in fact part of a continuum of violent 
technologies that are both connected with, and 
imbricated in, this shift to governing through the 
community.8 Not only is the term ‘community’ a 
discursive construct but, as I argue, because of its 
distinctively punitive iterations, both in the present 
and historically, it manifests as a peculiar mix of 
socialist-based grassroots activism, coupled with 
violently exclusionary attitudes towards those 
accused of criminality. I show how violent punishment 
is one of the consequences of this turn towards 
democratic localism. As such we should question the 
way in which the ‘community’ is deployed as a tool of 
crime prevention, and subject it to rigorous scrutiny. 
I start by discussing the argument that community/
democratic policing is opposed to the principles of 
liberal minimalism enshrined in the South African 
Constitution.9 I then discuss the consequences of 
the ANC’s version of ‘mass political culture’; how 
the ‘cultural patterns’ inherited from the struggle 
against apartheid combine with the way in which  
the problem of crime, and what to do about it, is 
framed by political rhetoric, resulting in an approach 
that significantly stigmatises deviance.10 Deploying 
Zimring’s concept of ‘symbolic transformation’ I argue 
that the distrust that poor communities have of the 
police translates into a call for more (and not less) 
punitive treatment of criminals.11 Finally, I make some 
recommendations for future research.
Contradiction or coherence?
One explanation for the apparent contradiction 
in embracing the benign-sounding ‘community’, 
together with ‘the prison’, is that in fact these 
are not simultaneous, but consequential, penal 
developments. Thus, although the state embraced 
community policing and restorative justice in the early 
days of the heyday of rainbow nation democracy, 
in fact it soon thereafter shifted into a more punitive 
gear due to the panic about crime, and pressure to 
do something about it.12 The argument, brought to 
its logical conclusion, is that community/democratic 
policing is somehow opposed to the punitive style 
of policing recently adopted by the South African 
state. In a challenging and provocative article 
Hornberger counters this analysis, arguing that the 
‘current [punitive] changes’ should be interpreted as 
‘popular rather than elite or autocratic’.13 This helps 
to make sense of what might otherwise appear to be 
‘contradictory, incoherent trends’.14
According to Hornberger, community policing, 
which she refers to as ‘a policing of proximity’, 
seeks legitimacy from the community. This involves 
a ‘penetration of policing by forms of local justice’.15 
These forms of justice, which include the call for 
‘illegal violence’, are removed from what Hornberger 
refers to as ‘the civility of the law’.16 I argue that 
this ‘illegal violence’ is in fact part of a continuum of 
community-based crime prevention and punishment 
practices, where the legal and illegal are blurred, and 
where the state is complicit in the construction of 
vengeful ‘communities’. In a context of great scarcity 
and rampant social and economic inequality, ‘mob’ 
justice serves as an occasion for victims, and the 
communities with which they are linked, to proclaim 
the extent of their suffering and seek punitive redress. 
It is structured by the state insofar as victims (and 
their communities) have, in the past 20 years, 
discursively at least if not always in practice, come to 
assume a central role in the criminal justice system. 
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Instead of seeing vigilantism as a form of ‘mob 
justice’, as a scourge, as inimical to ‘civil’ society and 
as being somehow outside of and opposed to it, I 
argue that we should acknowledge how vigilantes, 
or at least their supporters, are in fact part of ‘civil 
society’.17
‘Mass political culture’ 
and the community
Rooted as it is in 1980s notions of people’s power 
and the left-wing notion of grassroots democracy, 
the term ‘community’ has great rhetorical 
purchase in South Africa today. It encapsulates 
the communitarian emphasis of the ‘people shall 
govern’ clause of the Freedom Charter, echoes the 
global embracing of informalism, is presented as an 
effective means of combatting crime, and of course 
dovetails with the neoliberal shift towards greater 
responsibilisation – across all fields of government 
– by shunting responsibility from the state to the 
‘people’ (a.k.a. ‘the community’).
This form of governance, one that operates in 
terms of a ‘liberation paradigm’, valorises local 
level initiatives by constantly seeking to mobilise 
communities on the ground.18 Thus, in 1992, the 
ANC stated that it was ‘the community who are 
largely responsible for prosecutions [and] ... not 
the police alone who combat crime’.19 One of the 
objectives of Community Policing Forums (CPFs) is 
to ‘enhance the ability of the police to combat and 
prevent crime, disorder and fear, in partnership with 
the community’, and parole boards are meant to give 
the ‘community’ a special say in release decisions.20 
Not only has democratisation ushered in a growing 
discursive emphasis on giving crime victims a role 
to play in sentencing, bail and parole decisions, but 
the South African Police Service (SAPS) measures 
the success of its ‘social crime prevention strategy’ 
in terms of the number of crime awareness 
programmes, neighbourhood watches, business 
forums and street committees that are established 
to deal with crime.21 In some instances the notion 
of partnership policing even includes ‘mobilising the 
community to oppose bail’ via collaboration with the 
CPF.22 Indeed, the community is so fundamental to 
policing in democratic South Africa that police will, in 
future, be subjected to a ‘stringent new recruitment 
process’ that includes ‘being paraded in front of 
community members’, via a ‘community parade’.23 
A 1997 amendment to the Criminal Procedure Act 
51 of 1977 provides for crime victims and/or the 
community in which the crime occurred to play 
a role in bail decisions. In particular, a court may 
refuse bail where the release ‘will disturb the public 
order or undermine the public sense of peace or 
security’.24 The criteria that it may take into account 
relate entirely to how the community will react to the 
release. Thus bail may be refused where: 
•	 The	nature	of	the	offence	is	likely	to	induce	a	sense	
of shock or outrage in the community where the 
offence was committed25 
•	 The	shock	or	outrage	of	the	community	might	lead	




of peace and security among members of the 
public 
•	 The	release	may	undermine	or	jeopardise	public	
confidence in the criminal justice system26 
In this way then, the door is opened for an 
ambiguous and vengeful ‘community’ to play a 
central role in the supposedly neutral criminal justice 
system. Pratt refers to this as a ‘decivilising process’ 
in terms of which the ‘liberal notions of unemotive 
sentencing and bail decisions’ are undermined.27
History of the present
Marginalised communities in South Africa have a 
history of self-policing. Moreover, political violence 
has always played a prominent role in local politics.28 
Both the National Party government and the ANC 
liberation movement used the death penalty against 
their enemies, and the radical traditions of people’s 
power and ungovernability sometimes resulted in 
violent punishment.29 As such, punishment in South 
Africa has historically been relatively unconstrained 
by the minimalist considerations associated with 
liberalism.30
In the turbulent 1980s the apartheid state depicted 
township activists as violent criminals and terrorists, 
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stripping their acts of any political dimension. At the 
same time the ‘comrades’ committed violent acts 
in the name of politics while accusing South African 
government officials and their lackeys of being the 
real criminals. At times, when criminal gangs looted 
trucks driving into the townships, some political 
activists claimed that this was part of the struggle.31 
Similarly, certain acts – such as ‘necklacing’ – that 
might otherwise be regarded as gratuitous violence, 
assumed some kind of political salience, due to the 
fact that the targets of these acts were accused of 
being spies or apartheid collaborators, and thus on 
the wrong side of the ‘just war’. In fact, there was 
some substance to the claims of both the state 
and political movements. Among and alongside 
the ‘comrades’, activities and people emerged 
to take advantage of these township struggles to 
wreak violence for their personal gain – hence the 
appearance of the label ‘comtsotsis’, meaning 
criminals masquerading as ‘comrades’.32 
With the transition from a white minority government 
to a black majority government in 1994, the ANC had 
to transition from a liberation organisation calling for 
ungovernability in the black townships, to a governing 
party. As such it had to govern and demonstrate 
control over a crime situation about which citizens 
were becoming increasingly vocal, and which it had 
hitherto ignored. Tensions arose between its previous 
pronouncements on how it would deal with crime, 
the punitive practices that it now adopted, and its 
attempts to legitimate the police via community or 
‘democratic’ policing. As crime became increasingly 
politicised – the subject of many parliamentary 
debates and a general consensus on the need to 
treat criminals harshly – so too did the new ANC 
government seek to simultaneously legitimate the 
previously vilified police and prove that it was not 
soft on crime. It did so via a two-pronged strategy 
of implementing community policing and uncoupling 
criminals from a political and social context, 
presenting them as a threat to the country’s young 
democracy. Thus, at the opening of Parliament 
in 1995, then President Nelson Mandela blamed 
crime and violence for ‘eroding the foundation of our 
democracy’, necessitating a ‘harsher approach’.33 A 
decade later, political leaders have called on police 
to ‘kill the bastards’,34 to ‘teach them a lesson’35 
by means of the use of lethal force and to show 
‘no mercy’.36 This is a far cry from the 1992 ANC 
discussion document ‘Crime and crime control’ 
which, to give one example, ascribed gang formation 
to ‘structural and political reasons’ and presented 
gang members as having ‘legitimate economic 
needs’.37  
As such, there is no doubt that crime and punishment 
have assumed an ideological importance in the 
‘new’ South Africa that is markedly different from the 
situation during apartheid. This ‘hyper-politicisation 
of penal policy’ frames the field of punishment (and 
other ‘self-help’ initiatives) in Khayelitsha and other 
marginalised South African townships.38 
The legitimacy conundrum
Community solutions to crime and policing are 
attractive, not because they actually reduce the 
incidence of offences but because, like punitive 
punishments, they reassure people that something is 
being done to collectively prevent crime.39 De Klerk 
argues that the ideology of collectivism encourages 
vigilantism because the raised expectations 
generated by institutions of partnership policing, such 
as CPFs, are inevitably not met.40
During evidence given at the Commission of Inquiry 
into Policing in Khayelitsha (hereafter referred to as 
the Khayelitsha Commission), a senior police officer 
stated that he knew about ‘formal meetings’ that 
had resulted in a decision to evict people from their 
homes due to a crime.41 A resident testified that 
when the ‘community’ had called her to a meeting, 
demanding that her nephew leave the area due to 
his alleged ‘criminality’, she did not argue, and did 
not think of other options: ‘Our main concern was 
that he should leave the house so he wouldn’t be 
harmed. We could see the mood of the residents 
and it appeared that they would do something.’42 
Another witness stated that the boys who had 
allegedly stolen his niece’s money, leather jacket and 
cellphone climbed into his car voluntarily because 
‘they were asking us not to assault them, saying that 
their parents were going to pay back the money’.43 
Similarly, a teenager living in a tin shack in Enkanini 
told me that when her blankets and hair-iron were 
stolen during a break-in she did nothing, because 
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she did not see the thieves – but that if she had seen 
them she would have alerted the ‘community’ to 
assist her in retrieving her goods.44 In this sense then, 
there is a desire for criminals to be banished and for 
the victims to get their goods back.
Banishment in informal settlements sometimes 
takes the form of demolition of the dwellings of 
suspected criminals. In some instances a decision 
taken at street committee level to banish an ‘offender’ 
by demolishing his/her shack is taken too far 
when the enforcers not only destroy the dwelling 
but also assault (or kill) the resident, sometimes 
destroying other homes in the purging process.45 
One of my interviewees was a member of three 
different committees, all with varying relationships 
with the state: the local neighbourhood watch, a 
less formalised community patrol group, and the 
Khayelitsha CPF. He had also been a participant 
in the demolition of three shacks in an informal 
settlement after a decision to this effect was taken at 
a ‘general council’ gathering of the street committees 
in his area.46 Thus, members of neighbourhood 
watches and street committees may be, or may 
have been, the same people who become part of a 
‘mob’ – the point being that there is fluidity between 
structures. As such it becomes difficult to distinguish 
the mob from the community, the unlawful from the 
lawful. 
Where the police encourage the public to engage in 
partnership policing, join neighbourhood watches, 
establish community patrols, and observe and report 
crimes, they create the expectation that they will 
be available to assist in instances when crime is 
detected.47 However, given a scarcity of resources, 
particularly in poorer communities, this promise 
cannot be fulfilled. There are widespread allegations 
of police complicity and police have themselves 
admitted that they tacitly permit violent community-
based ordering processes.48 Surprisingly, some 
members of the Social Justice Coalition (SJC) also 
expressed support for the beating of ‘criminals’ by 
‘community members’ as a technique to retrieve 
stolen goods, even though they stated that they 
themselves did not participate in violent activities.49
Dominant public discourse in South Africa is replete 
with allegations that criminals are released on bail 
when they should not be, that prisons are like five-
star hotels, that the criminal justice system is too 
slow, that the police do not do their jobs properly, 
that there are too many acquittals, that there are 
too many early releases; the list is endless. One only 
has to peruse the record of the evidence given at 
the Khayelitsha Commission to find overwhelming 
evidence in this regard. The point of this article is 
not to prove/disprove the veracity of these claims 
but to note their prominent presence and, at the 
same time, to observe how, in the quest for harsh 
treatment of criminals, the negative consequences 
of imprisonment are almost entirely excised from the 
debate.
Despite this lack of trust in the criminal justice 
system, in what Zimring refers to as a process 
of ‘symbolic transformation’,50 the consistent call 
from residents in marginalised communities is for 
a more intimate relationship with a punitive state. 
This translates into a call for more arrests, punitive 
punishments, including long prison sentences, and 
the reinstatement of capital punishment.51 Even 
though the state is largely absent/failing/distant, 
however one describes it, citizens of ‘frontier 
societies’, lacking the resources that the well-off 
have to deploy private security, translate an exercise 
of police power (in other words a punitive criminal 
justice system) into a service for victims.52 
Conclusion
As Garland points out, ‘liberal institutions’ such as 
the rule of law and Bill of Rights are not the same 
as democratic institutions.53 Whereas the former 
tend to constrain state punishment, the latter are 
not concerned with restraint but with punishing in 
accordance with what the majority wants. In South 
Africa the history of the liberation struggle, combined 
with apartheid-sanctioned self-help township 
initiatives, people’s courts, notions of community 
empowerment and grassroots localism, have given 
popular democracy an exceptional flavour. Looking 
back from the vantage point of 2014, it is clear that 
the South African version of mass democracy exists 
uneasily, side by side, with the liberal minimalism of 
its Constitution.
institute for security studies12
While the idea of community sounds progressive and 
inclusive, important questions should be asked about 
the power relations between different communities, 
within communities, and between communities and 
state agents. The danger of rallying communities 
around crime combatting is that it can, and does, 
unleash violent practices in the quest for a ‘moral 
community’.54 The ironic twist is that ‘mob justice’ is 
in part a mass technology to protect private property 
in a context of endemic inequality.55 When community 
members unite against an outsider they are bonded 
for an intense moment in a way that masks the very 
real problems that tear the community apart and/or 
separate it from other less or more socially connected 
and empowered communities.56  
I have argued in this article that violent community-
based punishments are constitutive of, and 
constituted by, violent state punishments and crime 
prevention practices (both lawful and unlawful). For 
this reason South African researchers and policy-
makers would do well to heed Johnson’s exhortation 
to ‘examine the conditions that determine whether 
and to what extent participants in community-based 
crime prevention initiatives are prepared to act 
outside the law in given circumstances.57
In particular, a research agenda in marginalised 
communities should include the phenomenon of 
punitive populism by mapping the field of crime 
prevention and punishment practices – asking how 
penality is constituted within specific localities. 
Instead of presenting ‘communities’ and ‘mobs’ as 
self-evident binaries we should interrogate the power 
relationships, local politics, societal networks, social 
capital and other dynamics that constitute these 
transient and non-homogenous groupings. 
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